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The Content-independence of Political Obligation:  
What It Is and how to Test It 
 
Laura Valentini 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Forthcoming in Legal Theory  
(pre-publication, pre-copy-edited version)  
Abstract: One of the distinctive features of the obligation to obey the law is its 
content-independence. We ought to do what the law commands because the law 
commands it, and not because of the law’s content—i.e., the independent merits of 
the actions it prescribes. Despite its popularity, the notion of content-independence 
is marked by ambiguity. In this paper, I first clarify what content-independence is. I 
then develop a simple test—the “content-independence test”—that allows us to 
establish whether any candidate justification of the obligation to obey the law 
delivers genuine content-independence. I apply this test to prominent such 
justifications and conclude that several of them, surprisingly, fail it.    
1. Introduction 
Consider the following dialogue. 
 
John: “Damn! Another fine!” 
Traffic warden: “Sir, the light was red, and you drove through.” 
John: “But there was nobody around. I didn’t endanger anyone. Now give 
me a good reason why I should have stopped!” 
Traffic warden: “The law says so.” 
 
Is the traffic warden right? Answering in the affirmative means vindicating political 
authority and the corresponding pro tanto moral obligation (or duty) to obey the 
law.
1
 Doing so is no easy task. It involves explaining something rather puzzling: the 
                                                 
1
 In this paper, I use the notions of obligation and duty interchangeably. 
 2 
fact that one “is morally required to act as the legal rules direct simply because they 
have the status of law, and not because of the rules’ content.”2 This is known as the 
content-independence of the obligation to obey the law.
3
 
Despite being widely invoked in discussions about political authority, the 
notion of content-independence is clouded by ambiguities.
4
 Once these ambiguities 
are cleared, it also becomes apparent that several prominent theories of political 
authority do not establish a content-independent obligation to obey legal directives. 
To anticipate, I show that instrumentalist, fair-play, natural-duty, and associative 
theories of political authority all fail to vindicate a content-independent obligation to 
obey the law, while consent and democratic theories succeed. Even though my 
discussion does not culminate in a positive defence of either political obligation or 
anarchism, my argument makes several contributions to the relevant literature. It 
                                                 
2
 David Lefkowitz, The Duty to Obey the Law, 1 PHILOS. COMPASS 571–598 (2006), at 572–573, 
emphasis original. 
3
 The idea of content-independence was first introduced in H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: 
STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY (1982), ch. 10; see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986), ch. 2. As John Gardner has argued, the notion of content-
independence is potentially misleading. A better label would be “merit-independence”: the 
obligatoriness of a certain action stems not from the merits of that action, but from the source of the 
requirement to perform it (in this case, the law). John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM. 
J. JURISPRUD. 199–227 (2001), at 209. In the main text, I will sometimes use the “merit” terminology. 
Note that, in the paper just cited, Gardner discusses merit-independence in relation to legal validity 
rather than moral obligatoriness. Still, that notion carries over to the domain of moral obligation.   
4
 For related discussions, which also highlight ambiguities in the idea of content-independence, see 
Stefan Sciaraffa, On Content-Independent Reasons: It’s Not in the Name, 28 LAW PHILOS. 233–260 
(2009); Paul Markwick, Law and Content-Independent Reasons, 20 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 579–596 
(2000). 
 3 
clearly sets out a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for a successful 
justification of political authority, shows that—contrary to first appearances—
prominent candidate justifications fail to meet that condition, and highlights an 
important feature of justifications that do meet the condition.
5
   
I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I consider what content-independence is a 
property of. In Section 3, I distinguish content-independence from other, related 
notions, and devise a test that allows us to establish whether any purported 
justification of political authority does indeed vindicate a content-independent 
obligation to obey the law: the “content-independence test” (for short, “CIT”). In 
Sections 4 and 5, I sort some prominent justifications of political authority into those 
that pass the CIT and those that fail it. In Section 6, I draw some brief lessons from 
this discussion and conclude.  
 Before starting, let me clarify terminology. First, I define authority as the 
moral power to place others under pro tanto obligations to do as one commands 
                                                 
5
 One may wonder whether content-independence is indeed a necessary feature of the obligation to 
obey the law “proper.” In line with much of the literature, the present paper is developed under the 
assumption that it is. Skeptics about content-independence as a feature of political obligation are thus 
unlikely to be moved by my arguments. For reviews of the literature on political obligation and 
authority that state the content-independence condition, see, e.g., Lefkowitz, supra note 2; William 
A. Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 LEG. THEORY 215–259 (2004); 
Thomas Christiano, Authority, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/authority/ (last visited Apr 21, 2014). 
For a recent defence of content-independence, see N. P. Adams, In Defense of Content-Independence, 
23 LEG. THEORY 143–167 (2017). 
 4 
(where “pro tanto” means “susceptible to being overridden”).6 Suppose A commands 
B to φ. If A has authority over B, then B ought to φ because A has required B to φ. 
Second, I understand political authority as the moral power of the state to issue 
binding commands through law. Finally, I call the pro tanto obligation of obedience 
that the law places on citizens political obligation. (For ease of exposition, I will 
often omit the qualification “pro tanto” when referring to political obligation.) 
2. What is content-independence a property of? 
If one is politically obligated to φ, one ought to φ because the law commands φ-ing, 
not by virtue of the independent goodness of φ-ing. This is why political obligation 
is associated with the notion of content-independence. But what, exactly, is content-
independence a property of? Two answers are in principle possible, each offering a 
distinctive interpretation of the expression “having a duty to do what the law 
commands because the law commands it,” i.e., a duty to obey the law.7  
 
1. Having a duty to [do what the law commands because the law commands it]. 
2. Having a duty to do what the law commands [because the law commands it]. 
 
                                                 
6
 For some, the obligation to obey is owed to the authority (i.e., it is correlative to the authority’s 
right), and the authority may then hold those who disobey to account for their failures. Here, I remain 
agnostic about this feature of authority. My arguments apply whether the obligation to obey is taken 
to be correlative to a right or not. For defences of the rights-correlativity of authority-imposed duties, 
see Stephen Darwall, Authority, Accountability, and Preemption, 2 JURISPRUDENCE 103–119 (2011); 
Scott Hershovitz, The Authority of Law, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
65–75 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012). 
7
 On this, see Hershovitz, supra note 6 at 69.  
 5 
As observed by Scott Hershovitz, on interpretation (1), a duty to obey the law is a 
duty whose content involves performing certain actions for a particular reason (and 
not others), namely the fact that the law has issued a directive to that effect. In this 
case, content-independence is a property of an agent’s obligatory “subjective” 
reasons for action. On interpretation (2), by contrast, the obligation to do as the law 
commands is justified by appeal to the fact that the law commands it. In this case, 
content-independence is a property of the justification of the duty to obey.
8
   
 Which of these two interpretations is preferable? Interpretation (1) seems 
implausible.
9
 To see this, assume, for example, that John has an obligation to obey 
tax law in sense (1). Assume, further, that John does pay his taxes as prescribed by 
the law, but that his subjective reason for doing so is not that the law requires him to 
pay—as demanded by (1)—but instead that justice requires him to pay or that he 
does not want to get caught cheating on his taxes. If we accept reading (1), we have 
to conclude that, despite paying the amount of tax required by law, John has 
disobeyed the law and thereby acted wrongly. Clearly, this is neither how we would 
                                                 
8
 Id. at 69. Hershovitz uses the language of “grounds” instead of “justification.” For the purposes of 
my discussion, these should be seen as equivalent. I employ the expression “justifying political 
obligation” meaning “explaining what grounds political obligation.”   
9
 Interpretation (1) is in line with how, e.g., Leslie Green understands the content-independence of 
authority-imposed obligations: as placing constraints on the reasons that should guide their 
addressees’ practical deliberations and actions. See LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 
(1990), at 41–42, 225. For critical discussion of Green’s interpretation of content-independence, see 
Stephen Perry, Political Authority and Political Obligation, in OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 2 1–74 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2013), at 13–15. 
 6 
normally use the language of obedience, nor does it seem substantively plausible to 
conclude that, by paying his taxes (as he ought to), John has acted wrongly.
10
  
 In response, one could suggest that interpretation (1) is more suited as an 
account of virtuous (rather than rightful) acting. Note, however, that this suggestion 
is plausible only in those cases where one’s obligation to φ really is justified by the 
fact that the law requires one to φ, i.e., where interpretation (2) is satisfied. 
Otherwise, we would have to face the implausible implication that agents may act 
non-virtuously even when they act for the reasons that in fact justify the obligations 
that they have.  
To see this, let us stipulate, for the sake of argument, that what justifies 
people’s obligation to stop at red lights is not the fact that the law requires it, but 
broader considerations of safety. Amber always stops, but she does so not because 
the law requires it, but because this is safest for everyone. On the “virtue” reading of 
interpretation (1), by so acting, she displays a lack of virtuous character. But, surely, 
we would want to say that the virtuous agent is precisely the one who acts for the 
right reasons, i.e., for the reasons that justify the obligations that she has.
11
 So, even 
as an account of virtuous action, as opposed to rightful or wrongful action, 
interpretation (1) only makes sense in those cases where it is true that one’s 
obligation to φ is justified by the fact that the law demands that one φs. 
                                                 
10
 Hershovitz comes to the same conclusion, by pointing out that the law is often indifferent to why 
we act as it commands, so long as we act as commanded. See Hershovitz, supra note 6 at 67–68. For 
a similar argument, see also Perry, supra note 9 at 14. Cf. Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, 14 
PHILOS. PUBLIC AFF. 3–29 (1985), at 7. 
11
 Cf. Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, 1 NOTRE DAME J. LAW ETHICS 
PUBLIC POLICY 139–55 (1985), at 140–141. 
 7 
 In light of these considerations, I will focus on interpretation (2), and treat 
content-independence as a feature of the justification of the obligation to do what the 
law commands.
12
 
3. What content-independence is not, and how to test it  
We are now clearer about what content-independence is a property of. Before 
moving on, we should also clarify what content-independence is not. Specifically, 
we should distinguish content-independence from content-insensitivity and 
judgement-independence. A failure to recognize these distinctions may be 
responsible for misplaced scepticism about the very possibility of there being a 
content-independent obligation to obey the law. 
3.1 Content-independence, content-insensitivity, and judgement-independence 
First, content-independence should not be confused with content-insensitivity.
13
 The 
fact that what justifies political obligation must be a property of the law qua law, and 
not of its content, is compatible with political obligation being conditional on the 
content of legal commands meeting certain standards of moral acceptability.
14
 This 
is a familiar phenomenon. Consider, for example, promise-based obligations. What 
                                                 
12
 This is in line with Stephen Perry’s view that content-independence should be understood as a  
“constraint on the type of argument that can be offered to demonstrate that a directive is obligatory 
[…] [, and not as] a constraint on the practical reasoning of persons who are supposedly bound by 
the directive.” Perry, supra note 9 at 15.  
13
 Cf. George Klosko, Are Political Obligations Content Independent?, 39 POLIT. THEORY 498–523 
(2011). See also the critical discussion in Kevin Walton, The Content-Independence of Political 
Obligations: A Response to Klosko, 42 POLIT. THEORY 218–222 (2014). 
14
 But cf. Adams, supra note 5 at 151. 
 8 
justifies those obligations is not an independent property of their content. If I 
promise to meet you for lunch, my obligation to meet you is not justified by 
reference to the independent qualities of the action “meeting you for lunch.” 
Meeting you for lunch might not be such a good idea. What justifies my obligation 
is the fact that I have made you a promise. Yet, if the content of my promise were 
deeply immoral, this would “block” the obligation-generating power of promising.15 
For example, the fact that a mafioso promises another mafioso to commit some 
horrible crime does not generate any moral obligation: the criminal content of the 
promise invalidates it. This reassures us that we cannot have moral obligations to 
obey abhorrent laws, but it still does not tell us by virtue of what we can be obligated 
to obey morally decent ones.  
 Some anarchists, especially Robert Paul Wolff, seem to think that nothing 
could possibly justify a content-independent obligation to do as the law requires, 
since this would violate our duty to be autonomous and always act on our 
judgement.
16
 As frequently remarked in the literature though, this duty is rather 
dubious.
17
 If, say, Tom’s moral judgement is superior to mine, it is unclear what 
could possibly be wrong in my acting on the basis of Tom’s moral assessment of a 
given situation rather than on the basis of my own. Still, even assuming that there is 
such a duty—hence conceding one of the anarchist’s key premises—accepting 
content-independent political obligation, in the sense defended in the previous 
section, does not contradict it.  
                                                 
15
 Joseph Raz, The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception, 90 MINN. LAW REV. 
1003–1044 (2006), at 1013. 
16
 ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970).  
17
 Harry G. Frankfurt, The Anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff, 1 POLIT. THEORY 405–414 (1973). 
 9 
To see this, consider the legal command “Stop at red lights!” If the law has 
authority, the existence of this legal command places you under a pro tanto 
obligation to stop at red lights. This is consistent with holding that, whenever you 
are faced with a red light, as a good or virtuous agent, you ought to deliberate about 
whether to stop and act on your best judgement. But if the law has authority, proper 
deliberation will have to take into account the fact that you have a law-based 
obligation to stop; an obligation that may be overridden by other considerations, 
depending on the circumstances.
18
 
The existence of content-independent obligations, then, does not contradict 
the commitment to judgement-dependence: the idea that one ought to act on the 
basis of one’s own best judgment in any given situation. Vindicating authority is 
                                                 
18
 This line of reasoning shares some similarities with the discussion in Joseph Raz, Legitimate 
Authority, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 3–27 (1979). Raz is committed to the view that a valid 
authoritative directive gives one second-order, exclusionary (or protected) reasons. See Id. at 17. A 
second-order, exclusionary reason to φ is a reason to φ that excludes some other reasons as grounds 
for (not) φ-ing (i.e., it is “protected” by this exclusion). This being so, on Raz’s view, a valid 
authoritative directive always affects the proper content of an agent’s practical deliberations: 
excluded reasons should not serve as grounds for action. However, if other, non-excluded reasons 
bear on an agent’s decision, these may figure in the agent’s practical deliberations. This is why Raz 
concludes that, in the face of valid authoritative directives, it remains true that one ought to “act on 
one’s judgement on what ought to be done, all things considered,” but it is not true that, in those 
cases, one ought to act on one’s judgement “on the balance of first-order reasons.” See Id. at 27, 
original emphasis. Some such first-order reasons will be excluded by authoritative directives. I thank 
Joseph Raz for discussion of these matters. Unlike Raz, I am not committed to the view that 
authoritative directives generate second-order, exclusionary reasons. Therefore, on the framework I 
have proposed, an authoritative directive can be treated as a first-order reason (or a pro tanto 
obligation) to be added to the relevant balance of considerations. Note, also, that conceiving of valid 
authoritative directives as giving rise to exclusionary reasons is arguably reminiscent of interpretation 
(1) of the obligation to obey the law, discussed and rejected in the previous section. One may thus 
wonder whether, on the “exclusionary reasons” framework, an authoritative command to φ gives us 
an obligation to [φ because it was commanded, and not because of excluded reasons (not) to φ]. 
For critical discussion, see Hershovitz, supra note 6 at 69.  
 10 
hard not because authority negates our autonomy. The difficulty lies in explaining 
how the mere fact that some entity (e.g., the law) has issued a command to φ places 
us under an obligation to φ.  
3.2 The content-independence test 
If legal commands are to have any authority, some underlying principle must be 
invoked which allows us to explain why it is that “φ-ing being the object of a legal 
command” matters morally. Political obligation does not presuppose a dubious 
derivation of an ought from an is. Instead, its justification involves identifying a 
morally salient property P that attaches to the law qua law, and thereby explains 
why the fact that a certain action is prescribed or prohibited by law is morally 
significant. 
Consider a legal command to φ, and the claim that we ought to obey it 
because it displays property P. Now let us suppose that the command is “You ought 
to pay 10 dollars for this book” and that P is “fairness.” Although, at first, this may 
look like a justification for an authority-based obligation to φ, it is not. The relevant 
property P has little to do with the fact that φ-ing is prescribed by law, but attaches 
to its independent merits: 10 dollars is the fair price for the book in question. 
Therefore, P only justifies a content-dependent obligation to φ. 
To determine whether the authority-justifying property P proposed by any 
given theory of political obligation/authority meets the content-independence 
condition, we can subject it to the following, simple content-independence test.  
 
Content-independence test (CIT): Take a set of legal commands and 
assume that they satisfy property P, proposed by a particular theory 
purporting to vindicate political obligation. Then, do (A) or (B).  
 11 
 
A. Holding everything else constant, take one (or more) of those 
commands—e.g., the command to φ—and change its content to φ*, 
where φ*-ing does not violate the constraints of content-sensitivity 
(i.e., it is not morally impermissible). If the relevant property P is no 
longer satisfied by the modified command(s), we will know that P 
fails to establish a content-independent obligation to obey the law 
because it is the law.  
 
B. Holding everything else constant, imagine a new legal directive to 
φ* is introduced, where φ*-ing does not violate the constraints of 
content-sensitivity (i.e., it is not morally impermissible). If the new 
directive does not satisfy property P, we will know that P fails to 
establish a content-independent obligation to obey the law because it 
is the law.   
 
As should be apparent, both (A) and (B) involve changing the content of the law, the 
former by modifying existing laws, the latter by introducing new ones. The rationale 
behind this test is simple. If the obligation to obey the law is content-independent, 
then it must continue to exist even if the contents of the law—i.e., the actions that 
are its object—vary, provided they fall within the bounds of moral permissibility. 
But if property P, invoked to justify the authority of law, is not displayed by legal 
commands robustly across variations in their content, then P cannot justify an 
obligation to obey the law because it is the law. P, in that case, cannot attach to the 
law as such: i.e., to legal directives qua legal directives. 
 12 
These reflections may seem obvious, but appear to have been overlooked. As 
an application of the CIT in subsequent sections will show, prominent defences of 
the obligation to obey the law fail to pass it: they rely on morally salient properties 
that attach not to legal commands as such, but to the independent merits of their 
content.  
4. Applying the test I: Theories that fail it 
4.1 Instrumentalism 
Instrumentalist theories justify authority by appeal to the benefits it brings to its 
subjects. The most influential version of instrumentalism is Joseph Raz’s “service 
conception” of authority. In its original formulation, the service conception offers a 
schema for the justification of practical authority in general, rather than of the 
authority of law specifically. Still, that schema lends itself to being applied to the 
case of political authority. On this conception, the law has authority over an agent 
whenever he “would better conform to reasons that apply to him anyway […] if he 
intends to be guided by [legal] directives than if he does not.”19  
 This formulation leaves it in principle open what the relevant reasons that 
“apply to one anyway” are. Specifying this parameter, though, is unnecessary for 
our purposes. All we need is the property P that justifies the obligation to obey. On 
the instrumentalist view, this may be characterised as follows.  
 
                                                 
19
 Raz, supra note 15 at 1014. Raz adds the caveat that authoritative commands are valid only 
regarding those issues for which “it is better to conform to reason than to decide for oneself” (Id. at 
1014). Since this caveat is not relevant for my analysis, I have omitted it from the main text. For an 
earlier statement of Raz’s view, see Raz, supra note 10 at 19. 
 13 
P: “intending to be guided by the authority’s directives makes one better 
conform to reasons that apply to one anyway.” 
 
Let us apply the CIT to instrumentalism, looking at whether the obligation to act as 
the law requires persists under variations in the content of the law. Recall that, 
according to the CIT, all variations are meant to take place within a morally 
permissible range. 
Consider the following legal directives, addressed to citizen Sam, concerning 
tax contributions: “In year 1, you ought to pay 20000 dollars;” “In year 2, you ought 
to pay 21000 dollars”; “In year 3, you ought to pay 23000 dollars.” Let us assume 
that these directives exhibit P. For example, it may be that, in fact, Sam has reason 
to pay 20000, 21000, and 22000 dollars in each consecutive year, but if he were to 
do the calculation himself, he would come up with a tax bill of 22000, 23000 and 
24000 dollars, respectively. In light of this, Sam clearly gets closer to the right result 
if he treats the law as binding instead of acting on his own judgement. He is 1000 
dollars off in year 3 if he follows the law, but 2000 dollars off each year if he goes 
with his own judgement. 
 Let us then consider the following variation in the content of the relevant 
legal commands, in accordance with the CIT. Everything else is left constant, but 
now the law demands that Sam pays 23000 dollars in year 1, 24000 dollars in year 
2, and 25000 dollars in year 3. In this case, it looks like Sam gets closer to what he 
has reason to do by following his own calculations, rather than the law’s commands. 
Those calculations are “only” 2000 dollars off each year, while the law’s are 3000 
dollars off.  
 14 
As this example illustrates, on the instrumentalist view, a variation in the 
content of the law suffices to make a difference to whether we have an obligation to 
obey it. This means that property P proposed by the instrumentalist does not 
vindicate a content-independent obligation to obey the law. This should be 
unsurprising. After all, on the instrumentalist view, obedience to the law is just a 
proxy for what we have reason to do. And whether the law is a good “tracker” of 
what we have reason to do rests on how closely its content reflects the reasons we 
already have. Variations in content will obviously make a difference to the 
obligatoriness of law. 
Three objections might be raised at this point. First, it may be argued that the 
instrumentalist formula is compatible with the “tracked reasons” being of a 
procedural nature—as opposed to concerning the substance of the issue at hand—in 
which case my objection would no longer hold. For example, we may have most 
reason to act on the basis of democratic decisions; and if the law is democratically 
arrived at, following it maximizes our reason-compliance, independently of its 
content. The difficulty with this objection, as Scott Hershovitz has pointed out, is 
that it presupposes an implausibly broad interpretation of instrumentalism. On this 
interpretation, the theory loses its distinctiveness, and becomes compatible with all 
competing accounts of political authority (since each of them points to a particular 
set of reasons that apply to us, and which are said to justify an obligation to obey the 
law).
20
  
 Second, it may be objected that my discussion misunderstands the content-
independence condition, as proponents of instrumentalism conceive of it. Content-
independence, so the objection goes, is a property of one’s reasons for acting as the 
                                                 
20
 See Scott Hershovitz, The Role of Authority, 11 PHILOS. IMPR. 1–19 (2011), at 4–5. 
 15 
authority demands when the relevant conditions for its justification are satisfied. 
Those conditions, in turn, may well depend on the content of the commands issued 
by the authority. This means that in the first set of cases discussed above, where the 
content of the law is such that P is satisfied, Sam ought to [pay the amount 
prescribed by law because the law prescribes it].  
The trouble with this response is that, as shown in Section 2, this 
understanding of content-independence—associated with interpretation (1) of the 
obligation to obey—is implausible. If the arguments in that section are correct, 
retreating to this understanding of content-independence will not make for a 
convincing defence of instrumentalism.
21
 
Third, it may be pointed out that, for Raz, the law’s authority is evaluated 
relative to domains: i.e., classes of directives, not individual ones. The law has 
authority in a domain D, relative to a subject S, whenever the putative subject would 
better comply with the reasons that apply to him in that domain by following the law 
rather than his judgment. In other words, relative to domain D (e.g., traffic 
regulation, taxation, food safety, etc.) the law “gets it right” more than the subject 
would. Domains of authority so conceived vary from individual to individual. To 
use Raz’s own example, while the law has authority in the domain of drug safety for 
the vast majority of the population, it lacks such authority vis-à-vis an expert 
pharmacologist.
22
  
Considerations of content matter to the identification of the domains in 
which the law has authority: the domains in which it exhibits P relative to a given 
subject. However, once we are within a domain in which the law exhibits P, legal 
                                                 
21
 Cf. footnote 18. 
22
 RAZ, supra note 3 at 74. 
 16 
directives are binding irrespective of content, including on those occasions when 
they are mistaken, and following our own judgment would deliver better reason-
compliance. 
Given this, my objection may seem to misfire. Recall that, in line with the 
CIT, the objection involved changing the content of a few legal directives such that, 
relative to those, Sam would be better off by following his own judgment than by 
being guided by the directives. But changing the content of a few directives, so the 
reasoning goes, need not make a difference to the law’s authority relative to the 
domain of tax contribution as a whole. If it is true that, by and large, Sam is better 
off by following the law in that domain rather than his judgment—even once we 
take into account my envisaged change in content—then Sam ought to follow the 
law in that domain even in those particular instances where the law gets it “more 
wrong” than he would. If, however, changing the content of legal directives as I 
have in my example suffices to make the law less accurate than Sam’s judgment in 
the domain of tax contribution as a whole, then Sam lacks a content-independent 
obligation to obey it in that domain.
23
 
Crucial to the present response to my argument is the notion of a domain 
within which the law has authority. For the response to be successful, a domain of 
legal authority has to be defined independently of the set of individual legal 
directives that exhibit P. If a domain were just a set of legal directives that 
individually exhibit P, changing the content of a single directive such that it no 
longer satisfies P would automatically strip that directive of authority. In that case, 
morally permissible variations in content would clearly affect the authoritativeness 
of legal directives: the CIT would not be passed.  
                                                 
23
 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection. 
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What is needed, then, is an independent criterion for demarcating domains of 
authority. It seems, however, that no privileged criterion is available. One could, of 
course, reverse-engineer domains such that, within them, content-independence 
obtains. But this is both ad hoc and, as I will show, substantively implausible.  
To see this, take again the domain of drug safety. Now suppose that our 
character, Sam, happens to know a great deal about two particular drugs (X and Y) 
such that, relative to those two drugs, he would do better by following his judgement 
rather than the law’s directives. It is, however, still true that, in the domain of drug 
safety taken as a whole, Sam is better off by following the law. What principled 
reason is there for insisting on a single domain of drug safety in which the law has 
authority over Sam, as opposed to two domains: “safety for drugs X and Y” and 
“safety for all other drugs,” with the law having authority over Sam in relation to the 
latter, but not the former? Indeed, why not divide up domains relative to different 
categories of drugs? Or why not extend the domain so as to include drug as well as 
food safety, and so forth? Any such domain-demarcations seem arbitrary.
24
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 Raz shows awareness of this difficulty, but says relatively little about it. His solution—not further 
elaborated on—is that “a person or body has authority regarding any domain if that person or 
body meets the conditions [set out by the service conception] regarding that domain and there is 
no proper part of the domain regarding which the person or body can be known to fail the 
conditions.” Raz, supra note 15 at 1027, added emphasis. This quotation is not fully transparent, 
but can be interpreted as suggesting that, for any domain in which the person or body exhibits P 
(on the whole), the person or body has authority except for those “proper parts” of the domain 
for which it is known to fail to exhibit P. Presumably, those “proper parts” will be identified by 
looking at specific directives and asking whether they are known to exhibit P: if the answer is 
“no,” the directives will be removed from the domain of authority. Two points in relation to this 
response are worth making. First, Raz’s short passage suggests that valid authority rests not 
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Of course, one can construct domains in such a way that, within them, 
content-independence is achieved. The content of a few individual directives may 
change such that they no longer satisfy P, but this is consistent with authority being 
kept within the domain as a whole, hence with respect to those directives too. But, 
as I hope to have shown, this result is theoretically dubious if it is the mere product 
of an artificial adjustment of domains.  
Furthermore, adjusting domains so as to obtain content-independence is 
substantively implausible. This implausibility is brought out, unwittingly, in Raz’s 
own discussion of the classic “red light on an empty street” scenario. Raz offers this 
discussion to showcase the virtues of his view. But in so doing, he seems to me to 
highlight a difficulty instead.   
Raz considers the worry that, in the “red light on an empty street” scenario, 
one is obviously better off by crossing the street—contrary to the law—than by 
following the law’s directives. Raz maintains that this observation does not 
invalidate the law’s authority within the domain of traffic regulation, including in 
cases where, by hypothesis, ignoring a red light is the thing to do. This is because, 
within that domain, we are by and large better off by deferring to the law. Raz puts 
the point as follows. His passage is worth quoting in full:  
From our vantage point we have invented an example in which the question 
[whether to stop] does not arise since the answer (there is no reason [to stop]) 
                                                                                                                                         
merely on directives exhibiting P, but on it being known that they exhibit P. This differs from 
Raz’s official formulation of the service conception and creates ambiguities (which, however, I 
do not have the space to explore here). Second, this way of individuating domains of authority is 
susceptible to my original objection: a change in the content of a directive may make a 
difference to whether that directive is known to satisfy P, hence to whether it is authoritative. 
Thanks to Massimo Renzo and Daniel Viehoff for discussion.  
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is plain. But for the man in our example the question does arise; he has to 
discover whether there is no reason to stop. And if he is to inquire in this case, 
he has to inquire in many other cases. For us it looks ridiculous to hear him 
say, ‘I am bound to follow authority regardless of the merits of the individual 
case,’ for we know in advance what the merits are and forget that he has to 
find that out, and not only now but in many other cases as well.
25
 
 
This explanation is puzzling. It is not true that, when we are faced with a traffic light 
on an empty street, we need to work hard to find out what the merits of the situation 
are. Those are precisely cases where hard work is unnecessary, which is why we are 
better off following our judgment and crossing the street anyway. By contrast, when 
the traffic situation is more complex, we have reason to defer to the law, since the 
cognitive burden of figuring things out would be excessive and the risk of accidents 
high.  
It is artificial to suggest that, because we are better off deferring to the law 
when traffic is heavy—hence most of the time—in the domain of traffic regulation, 
the law is always authoritative, even when in fact we would be better off by 
following our own judgment.
26
 The view expressed in the latter statement does 
deliver content-independence (in the domain of traffic regulation), but it is 
substantively implausible: it is at odds with our lived moral experience. And, as I 
said earlier, it is also arbitrary. In fact, why not distinguish between the domains of 
“traffic regulation with heavy traffic” and “traffic regulation when there is no 
traffic”? And so on.  
Unless instrumentalists can provide a non-arbitrary criterion for domain-
demarcation, they should abandon reference to domains, and consider legal 
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 Note that this way of proceeding is in fact at odds with a suggestion Raz makes elsewhere, 
discussed in footnote 24. 
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commands one by one, asking whether each command displays property P, in 
relation to a particular agent A, given the agent’s state at time t, when the command 
is issued. But if this is how a substantively plausible and non-arbitrary version of 
instrumentalism works, then my original objection still applies. Variations in the 
content of the law make a difference to whether the law displays property P, hence 
to its moral bindingness. A plausible version of instrumentalism fails the CIT. 
 
4.2 Fair play 
Fair-play perspectives on political authority come in many variants, but the general 
principle underlying them has been succinctly stated by John Rawls: “We are not to 
gain from the cooperative labors of others without doing our fair share.”27 Fair-play 
theorists believe that this principle has important implications for political 
obligation. Citizens, they remark, benefit from the cooperative labors of others, in 
the form of receiving public goods and enjoying the stability offered by the rule of 
law. This puts them under an obligation to reciprocate, by doing their fair share in 
sustaining society. Doing otherwise would be equal to freeriding on others’ 
cooperation. But what counts as doing one’s fair share? Fair-play theorists answer: 
                                                 
27
 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999), at 96. For other versions of the principle, see H. L. A. 
Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHILOS. REV. 175–191 (1955), at 185; George Klosko, 
Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation, 16 PHILOS. PUBLIC AFF. 241–259 (1987); 
Richard J. Arneson, The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems, 92 ETHICS 616–633 (1982). 
For a critique, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974), at 90–95. I am here only 
focusing on versions of fair play based on the mere receipt of benefits, not versions involving the 
willful acceptance of benefits. For discussion, see A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND 
POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979), ch. 5. 
 21 
obeying the law. The property P of legal commands that justifies obeying them, on a 
fair-play account, is the following. 
 
P: “corresponding to what one ought to do as one’s fair share in a 
cooperative practice from which one benefits.” 
 
Let us run the CIT. Take the legal command “This year, you ought to pay 30000 
dollars in taxes.” Assume that the total sacrifice imposed by this legal command, 
combined with all other legal requirements, satisfies P, i.e., it amounts to your fair 
share of contribution. Now change the content of one legal command. For instance, 
assume that you are legally required to pay 35000 dollars instead. Everything else is 
exactly as it was before, hence there is no possibility for a “discount in burdens” 
somewhere else in the system. This being so, obedience to the new package of laws 
cannot correspond to doing your fair share anymore. Obedience now involves a net 
excess burden of 5000 dollars. Fair-play theory fails the CIT. 
 It might be objected that, provided the content of the law falls within the 
morally admissible range—as it does ex hypothesi in the cases I am discussing—
variations in content make no difference to obedience corresponding to one’s fair 
share. For example, anything between 20000 and 40000 dollars to be paid in taxes 
may be consistent with the law’s demands corresponding to your fair share. 
However, anything more or less would automatically push the system outside the 
constraints of moral permissibility.  
This response involves a suspicious reverse-engineering of the notion of a 
fair share, such that it fits anything the law demands within the constraints of moral 
permissibility. The question we are addressing is: Why ought we to do whatever the 
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law demands, provided it is not morally impermissible? Fair play theorists answer 
by appeal to the idea that doing so corresponds to doing one’s fair share. But for this 
answer to justify the duty to obey the law, the notion of a fair share it invokes must 
not, by definition, be “whatever the law demands, provided it is not morally 
impermissible.” If this is our definition of a fair share, then fair play theory will not 
justify the obligation to obey the law by reference to an independent notion of a fair 
share, but will simply assume that obligation.  
Another objector might complain that I have misinterpreted the fair-play 
view, insofar as, on its most plausible version, that view need not appeal to an 
independent notion of a fair share in the first place.
28
 Instead, the view is best 
interpreted as stating that: If one benefits from a cooperative practice, thanks to 
others’ compliance with its terms of cooperation, one ought also to abide by those 
terms (provided these are not morally impermissible). Property P, for fair play 
theory, would then turn into P’. 
 
P’: “corresponding to the (morally permissible) terms of a cooperative 
practice from which one benefits.” 
 
Permissible variations in the content of the law arguably do not make a difference to 
its exhibiting property P’. Of course, we may conceive of changes in legal content 
that would make participation in the state (i.e., the cooperative practice on which we 
are focusing) no longer beneficial. However, those changes would likely be morally 
impermissible, since they would make living under the law no better than living in a 
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lawless condition. For this reason, they would automatically fall outside the scope of 
the CIT.  
 Does this mean that fair play theory is, ultimately, capable of delivering a 
content-independent obligation to obey the law? Not really. First, this last “version” 
of the theory does not, in fact, seem to have much of a claim to being a version of 
fair play. After all, its core principle makes no mention of the idea of fairness. 
Second, and relatedly, the view we are considering is less plausible than the original 
one, precisely because unqualified conformity with existing (and morally 
acceptable) terms of cooperation may involve doing more or less than one’s fair 
share of reciprocation. Furthermore, what about terms of cooperation (e.g., 
particular laws) from which nobody benefits?
29
 Consider new monitoring 
regulations recently introduced by several British universities, involving endless 
form-filling and reporting. It is virtually everyone’s view that such regulations 
increase administrative costs without generating any real benefit. Yet, they are part 
of the “terms of cooperation” structuring universities, and are certainly morally 
acceptable. But the claim, implicit in the revised version of the fair play view, that 
those rules too ought to be complied with appears ad hoc.  
Surely, if benefiting is what triggers the demand to abide by relevant terms 
of cooperation, the demand ought to extend only to mutually beneficial terms of 
cooperation, not to all the rules structuring a practice that is on the whole 
beneficial.
30
 But this would be tantamount to defending a “pick and choose” 
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 M. B. E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE LAW J. 950–976 
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 George Klosko, John Simmons on Political Obligation, 7 APA NEWSL. PHILOS. LAW 1–9 (2007), 
at 3. 
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approach to obedience, where we ought to do as the law says not “because it is the 
law,” but because and to the extent that doing so is mutually beneficial. This would 
make the revised version of fair play more independently plausible, but would again 
fail to vindicate a content-independent obligation to obey the law. 
It may be objected that the above discussion conflates content-independence 
with another feature of the obligation to obey the law, typically called “generality.” 
This is the idea that the obligation to obey the law binds one to obey all laws, and 
not only a subset of them. In response, I note that, although content-independence 
and generality are related, they are not the same. It is in fact possible to have 
generality without content-independence, for instance, when an obligation to comply 
with all laws in a given system is vindicated, but contingently on the laws having the 
content that they do. But whenever a certain property P fails to vindicate generality 
due to some laws’ having a given content, it automatically also fails to vindicate 
content-independence.  
 In sum, if I am right, the most plausible version of fair play theory fails the 
CIT. One could engineer a view in the vicinity of fair play that arguably does not 
fail the CIT, but this view neither appears properly to capture the moral rationale 
behind fair play, nor does it seem particularly plausible on its own terms.
31
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 David Lefkowitz and Massimo Renzo have independently pointed out to me that fair-play theory 
may be interpreted as involving a duty to do one’s share in sustaining the benefit of the rule of law, 
which implies a duty to do whatever the law demands, without using one’s discretion in determining 
what counts as one’s share. This interpretation appears to deliver content-independence but, I 
suggest, it is ad hoc and substantively unconvincing. Consider, for instance, agent A being faced with 
a red light on an empty road. The present interpretation of fair play would require A to obey the law 
and not cross: doing otherwise would be a violation of the rule of law. But it is mysterious why 
crossing would count as unfair in a case like this. By crossing, A would not take advantage of others’ 
 25 
4.3 Natural duties: negative and positive 
Natural-duty accounts of legitimate political authority hold that political obligation 
is justified by appeal to duties every human being holds just by virtue of being 
human, independently of voluntary acts or transactions. The relevant natural duties 
can be either positive—e.g., Samaritan duties to rescue others from certain perils—
or negative—e.g., duties not to pose unjust threats to others. The duty of justice to 
support just institutions (or not to impose unjust ones) also belongs to the family of 
natural duties, though its status as a positive or negative duty is somewhat 
contentious.
32
   
 Let me begin with positive duties of Samaritanism. These duties demand that 
we contribute our fair share in rescuing others from significant dangers. Proponents 
of Samaritanism in the context of political obligation note that the state of nature 
poses significant dangers to human beings, by constantly threatening them with war 
and instability. Since, so the argument goes, only under general laws can these 
dangers be avoided, Samaritan duties demand obedience to the law. Such obedience 
                                                                                                                                         
compliance with the law: the road is empty. In fact, if everyone, in A’s situation, were to cross the 
road, the benefits of traffic regulation would still be delivered. So we are not dealing with an instance 
of freeriding. Yet, on the “rule of law” interpretation of fair play, crossing the road would count as 
unfair. This suggests that the “rule of law” interpretation is ad hoc and substantively dubious: it 
stipulates that one’s fair share in reciprocating benefits always amounts to what the law demands. 
32
 John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, treats it as a positive duty, while Thomas Pogge, for example, 
sees it as a negative duty. THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS (2008). 
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corresponds to doing one’s fair share in rescuing others from the dangers of the state 
of nature.
33
 On Samaritan views, then, property P is characterised as follows: 
 
P: “corresponding to one’s fair share in rescuing others from significant 
dangers.” 
 
It is easy to see that property P cannot vindicate an obligation to obey the law 
irrespective of content. It suffers from exactly the same difficulties that plagued the 
first version of the fair play view. If law with content C corresponds to one’s fair 
share of burdens, law with content C*—where C* implies a different share of 
burdens—will not.  
 Proponents of Samaritanism too may respond by removing all reference to 
doing one’s fair share, turning P into P’. 
 
P’: “corresponding to what one must do to rescue others from significant 
dangers.” 
 
This move would again fail to deliver content-independence. To see this, let us 
assume, for the sake of argument, that the law, in state S, does satisfy property P’ at 
time t. Let us imagine that, at time t’, the parliament of S introduces a new tax, 
which requires every individual wishing to travel abroad to buy a stamp to attach to 
their passport. The stamp costs one dollar. It would seem strange to suggest that 
paying the one-dollar tax is what one must do to rescue others from significant 
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dangers. Universal lack of payment of that tax is perfectly compatible with the 
continued existence of the rule of law, peace and security. (And, plausibly, one may 
do a lot more to help those in danger by giving one dollar to Oxfam or some other 
charitable organization.)  
 It might be objected that by not paying, one is undermining the state’s 
provision of vital services. What if, for instance, the funds collected through this 
new tax were intended for the public healthcare system? The issue with this 
objection is that, on the Samaritan view, what people are meant to be “rescued from” 
thanks to others’ compliance with the law is not less-than-optimal healthcare, but the 
dangers of the state of nature. And even if not paying this passport tax would result 
in a failure to marginally improve the health service, it clearly would not send 
society back to state-of-nature conditions.
34
  
 In sum, while obedience to a good portion of the law may be necessary to 
satisfy P’, P’ fails to vindicate a content-independent obligation to obey the law 
because it is the law. Whether obedience is necessary to discharge one’s Samaritan 
obligations depends on the content of the various laws one is subjected to. 
Let us now turn to defences of political obligation based on a duty not to 
impose unjust threats on others. The line of reasoning behind them is remarkably 
similar to that invoked by proponents of Samaritanism. The idea is that submission 
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to a common legal framework, and obedience to it, is necessary for individuals not 
to pose unjust threats, as they instead do in the state of nature.
35
  
 
P: “corresponding to what one must do not to pose unjust threats to others.” 
 
If my concerns about the revised version of Samaritanism are valid, then they seem 
equally to apply to the “unjust threats” version of the natural-duty argument. The 
example involving the passport tax proves the same point in this case. It is unclear 
how, by not paying that tax, one would pose an unjust threat to others (unless we 
stipulate, problematically, that disobedience to the law by definition constitutes an 
unjust threat). Even universal failure to pay that tax would not send us back to the 
state of nature. So again, while obedience to a good portion of the law may be 
necessary to satisfy P, on the unjust threats view, P fails to vindicate a content-
independent obligation to obey the law because it is the law. 
Finally, natural-duty-of-justice views hold that obedience to the law is 
necessary in order to promote justice (or not to be implicated in injustice): i.e., to 
respect persons’ rights. Depending on one’s understanding of what, exactly, justice 
is about, natural-duty views might collapse into one of the previous two.
36
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P: “corresponding to what one must do to promote justice (or not to be 
implicated in injustice).” 
 
To convey my scepticism about the content-independence of the natural-duty-of-
justice view, I can rely on a helpful example offered by Chris Naticchia, aimed at 
showing how, on this view, “the normative force of legal commands […] is in virtue 
of their content.”37 Naticchia invites us to imagine a situation in which a particular 
subdivision of the Treasury, namely the one devoted to providing assistance to the 
needy (called Health and Human Services—HHS), is particularly inefficient. He 
then asks whether, given the rationale behind the natural-duty-of-justice view, 
citizens should comply with the demands imposed by HHS. His answer goes as 
follows: “Insofar as HHS is failing […] to achieve what justice requires […] we 
have no duty to support it.”38  This short example shows how whether the law 
exhibits property P, as P is understood by the natural duty view, depends on its 
content.
39
  
 Two objections might be raised in response. First, it may be suggested that 
Naticchia’s example is misleading, since the type of departure from perfect justice 
manifested by the HHS is sufficiently serious to fall outside the range of moral 
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permissibility. This response may undermine Naticchia’s specific example, but not 
the broader rationale behind it. Namely, that we cease to be bound by an obligation 
to obey the law whenever justice can be better promoted through means other than 
legal obedience. Even if the law’s departure from what justice requires is minimal, 
the obligation to obey at least some of it ceases to exist. But this simply means that 
the relevant obligation, on a natural-duty view, is not content-independent. 
 A second, more efficacious objection, points to the pervasiveness of 
reasonable disagreement concerning what justice requires. For example, there is 
reasonable disagreement about whether distributive justice demands basic income, 
Rawls’s difference principle, or a somewhat libertarian arrangement.  Equally, there 
is reasonable disagreement about immigration law, abortion, the full extent of 
freedom of speech and much else. Under these circumstances, proponents of natural-
duty views can plausibly argue, justice requires that reasonably contested issues be 
settled democratically, by giving everyone an equal say.
40
 In that case, doing as 
democratic procedures mandate is what honouring justice demands, and to the extent 
that the law is arrived at democratically, we ought to follow it, regardless of its 
content.
41
  
 I am sympathetic to this line of response, but for the time being, I limit 
myself to noting that it brings natural-duty-of-justice views very close to theories of 
political authority that appeal to the intrinsic fairness of democratic procedures. 
Those theories will be discussed in Section 5.2 below. Still, my arguments in the 
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present section are hopefully sufficient to show that natural-duty-of-justice views 
fail the CIT, at least when considered purely on their own terms (i.e., without being 
combined with democratic theories). 
4.4 Membership-based/associative views 
A large set of theories of political obligation can be classified under the label of 
“membership” or “associative” views. On these views, broadly construed, 
membership in a valuable (and morally permissible
42
) association justifies an 
obligation to obey the rules of the association.
43
  
Different accounts of what makes an association valuable deliver different 
versions of the associative view.
44
 On a subjectivist account, an association is 
valuable if one has the right attitudes towards it, e.g., if one identifies with it. On an 
objectivist account, an association is valuable if it instantiates objective moral 
values—such as reciprocity, justice, solidarity, mutual trust and so forth—
independently of whether one identifies with it.  
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 No matter how exactly we characterise a valuable association, the property 
that associative views focus on in justifying the authority of law may be 
characterized as follows. 
 
P: “constituting the terms of a valuable associative relationship in which one is 
involved.”  
 
At first sight, it may look like P passes the CIT. By definition, the law constitutes 
society’s terms of association. A change in the content of the law does not invalidate 
that property of the law. Things are somewhat more complex, however. Exhibiting 
P requires the law to constitute the terms of a valuable associative relationship, and 
variations in the law’s content can certainly render an association no longer 
valuable.
45
 Which content-changes have this effect depends on the underlying 
account of value at hand.  
As I have mentioned, different versions of the associative view rely on 
different accounts of what qualifies as a valuable association. On a subjectivist 
account, changes in the content of the law that lead members to feel alienated from 
their polity empty the association of its value. For instance, some in the United 
Kingdom no longer identify with their country after its decision to leave the EU. On 
a subjectivist account, once Brexit comes into effect—with the associated legal 
changes—UK law will lack the power to obligate them. Similarly, on an objectivist 
account, changes in legal content that make an association no longer serve the 
relevant values—e.g., justice, reciprocity, equal respect, etc.—result in the law’s 
failure to exhibit P. This being so, associativist views too do not pass the CIT. 
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 It may be objected that this conclusion is too quick. Of course, to the extent 
that certain variations in content result in the law no longer displaying P, associative 
views do not deliver content-independence. At the same time, we can imagine a 
range of cases across which variations in content do not affect the value of an 
association, hence do not undermine the law’s possession of P. For instance, 
imagine that the United States decided to follow several European jurisdictions and 
introduced “Bad Samaritan laws,” which criminalize failures of easy rescue. This 
would be a change in the content of the law—new laws would be added—yet one 
that seems unlikely to make a difference to the value of the association “United 
States,” whether this is understood subjectively or objectively. This suggests that, 
within a somewhat restricted range, content-independence obtains.  
 The difficulty with this response is that it trivializes the requirement of 
content-independence. The requirement would be satisfied for morally permissible 
variations in content that, in turn, meet some further content-dependent condition C. 
In the case of associative views, C corresponds to “consistency with an association 
being valuable.” But note that all other theories of political obligation canvassed up 
to this point would also fit this schema. For instrumentalists, C equals “the content 
of the law is such that following it ensures better reason-compliance;” for fair-play 
theorists, it is “the content of the law corresponds to one’s fair share;” for natural-
duty theorists, C corresponds to “the content of the law is such that obedience to it is 
necessary to escape the perils of the state of nature;” and so forth. But in all these 
cases, it is not true that we have obligations to obey permissible law irrespective of 
content. Instead, we have an obligation to obey the law because, and insofar as, its 
content is such that condition C is satisfied. The structure of this obligation is clearly 
content-dependent. Therefore, all theories discussed up to now, including associative 
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ones, fail to vindicate a content-independent obligation to obey the law because it is 
the law. 
5. Applying the test II: Theories that pass it 
I now turn to the positive part of my analysis, by applying the CIT to vindications of 
political authority that pass it.  
5.1 Consent 
A long-standing tradition in political philosophy holds that the authority of law rests 
on the consent of the governed.
46
 On this view, voluntarily agreeing to do as the law 
commands is sufficient to justify an obligation to obey it, provided its commands are 
morally permissible. The relevant property P identified by consent theorists is thus 
the following: 
 
P: “corresponding to what one has voluntarily agreed to do.” 
 
If one voluntarily consents to obeying the law—provided this falls within the limits 
of moral permissibility—then one’s consent will carry over no matter what precisely 
the content of the law is. For example, if I freely consent to doing whatever you tell 
me to do (provided this does not involve morally impermissible actions), whatever 
you tell me to do has the property of having my consent because you are the source 
of the demand. Similarly, if consent to obeying the law is what justifies the duty of 
obedience, then I ought to obey the law whether it demands that I pay 20000 or 
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25000 dollars in taxes, and independently of whether my own estimate about what I 
owe is more accurate than the bill provided by the tax authorities.  
 Consent-based approaches to the obligation to obey the law easily pass the 
CIT. 
5.2 Democratic theory 
Democratic approaches to political obligation hold that our obligation to obey the 
law is traceable to the law being the outcome of intrinsically fair procedures, which 
give everyone an equal say in determining the rules that should govern them.
47
 
There are, of course, countless versions of democratic theory—each offering 
somewhat different explanations for the intrinsic fairness of democracy
48—but they 
at least share the view that the authority of law derives from its democratic 
credentials. Looking for property P, this can be characterized as follows: 
 
P: “being the output of democratic procedures.” 
 
Property P does appear to pass the CIT. Take again a law demanding that I pay 
20000 dollars in taxes. Let us assume that it, together with every other law in the 
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system under examination, exhibits the relevant property P: it is democratically 
validated. Let us then hold everything else constant—including the process through 
which law is created—but assume that now the law demands that I pay 25000 
dollars. Clearly, a change in content makes no difference to whether the property of 
interest, i.e., “being the output of democratic procedures,” is satisfied. Since all else 
is held constant, the law in question is still the output of democratic procedures, and 
if it is this feature that explains why we should obey it, then obedience remains 
unaffected by changes in content. Democratic theory passes the CIT. 
6. Conclusion 
I have shown that, contrary to first appearances, prominent theories of political 
obligation do not vindicate a content-independent obligation to obey the law, and 
ipso facto, fail in their aim of vindicating political authority. However, I have also 
suggested that two theories—consent and democratic theory—succeed in passing 
the CIT. Where does this leave us?  
First, let me point out the limits of my inquiry. As I signalled at the start, an 
ability to vindicate content-independence is typically regarded as a necessary, but 
not a sufficient condition for a successful defence of political obligation. The 
theories which, I have argued, meet this condition, can certainly be criticized for 
failing in other respects.  
For instance, consent theory is unsatisfactory to the extent that it does not 
vindicate the universality of legal authority—i.e., its binding all citizens—since only 
a small number of individuals typically consent to legal obedience. Similarly, 
democratic theory has come under attack for failing to explain satisfactorily how it 
is that certain individuals are bound to obey a particular set of laws. As John 
Simmons explains, on a democratic view, if the United States annexed a portion of 
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Mexico (perhaps after a referendum in the combined territories of the US and that 
portion of Mexico) and started to govern the newly acquired population 
democratically, advocates of purely democratic approaches would have to conclude 
that former Mexicans are now obligated to obey US law. Yet this appears 
problematic.
49
  
 Even if my discussion cannot deliver a positive defence, or a conclusive 
refutation, of the obligation to obey the law, reflection on its outcome may help us 
move the debate forward, by telling us something about the kind of property that a 
candidate theory of political authority should rely on. Specifically, both consent and 
democratic theories appeal to procedural properties of the law, i.e., properties that 
consist in the law being the object of some valuable procedure (e.g., democracy or 
consent), as opposed to instrumental properties, i.e., properties concerning the 
effects of complying with the law. If democratic decision mechanisms and acts of 
consent are valuable, then it may be that our duties to honour the values in question 
infuse the law with moral normativity, independently of the effects of obedience, 
provided these fall within the bounds of moral permissibility.  
Democratic and consent views clearly pursue this proceduralist strategy. But 
what I wish to emphasize is the strategy itself, rather than these particular 
instantiations of it. Even if it turns out that democratic and consent theories do not 
succeed in vindicating political obligation, possible approaches pointing to other 
procedural properties of the law might. In sum, if the obligation to obey the law 
“proper” must be content-independent, and if a solution to the problem of political 
obligation exists, my arguments suggest that it is to be found in the space of the 
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law’s procedural properties. That said, only time will tell whether the search for a 
procedural property P will deliver a definitive answer to the anarchist challenge. 
 
Acknowledgements: I am very grateful to Christian List for extensive discussion 
and feedback, and to Kimberley Brownlee, David Lefkowitz, Massimo Renzo, and 
two anonymous reviewers for written comments. I also wish to acknowledge the 
support of the Leverhulme Trust (Philip Leverhulme Prize). 
 
